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Article
Influencers are professional, independent, content creators 
working on social media platforms across genres including 
gaming, gossip, and beauty. Several conventions underpin 
influencer production across each of these verticals; a drive 
toward “authenticity,” meaning personal and relatable self-
branding; platform contingency, in which content is shaped 
according to the logics and conventions of social media plat-
forms; and, finally, a curated and doggedly maintained inti-
macy with audiences. Despite these common threads, 
influencer cultures are rapidly developing and precarious; 
top creators and platforms rise and fall regularly, intermedi-
ary management models morph and change, working models 
and industry pay rates fluctuate and crash. Although influ-
encer economies have been framed as participatory, creators 
across intersections of marginalized identity often suffer the 
consequences of this innovation and instability, through 
underpayment and platform obscuration.
It is essential to consider the role of intermediaries in 
shaping influencer economies. In moments of rapid industry 
development, industry stakeholders often attempt to stabilize 
uncertainty and risk. To this end, 380 new influencer market-
ing “solution” platforms and agencies entered the global 
market in 2019 and 2020 (Influencer Marketing Hub, 2020). 
What the industry calls marketing “solutions,” hereafter 
referred to as influencer management tools, present analytics 
data and make algorithmic calculations designed to support 
marketers in selecting appropriate influencers for advertising 
campaigns, through subjective calculations about influenc-
ers’ brand safety and risk. As a 2020 market research report 
noted, the “temperature [in this space] is high” (Forrester, 
2020). Comparing the leading 12 tools in the market, the 
report observes that “all of the vendors have access to the 
same social media APIs; the differentiation comes in how 
this data is manipulated and presented to optimize marketers’ 
workflows” (Forrester, 2020). In other words, tools draw 
from publicly available data. They create value through 
developing algorithmic recipes and creative data presenta-
tion. Through their respective secret sauces these tools 
promise to support marketers in stabilizing the influencer 
marketing industry.
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This article explores algorithmic influencer management tools, designed to support marketers in selecting influencers for 
advertising campaigns, based on categorizations such as brand suitability, “brand friendliness,” and “brand risk.” I argue that, 
by approximating these values, tools reify existing social inequalities in influencer industries, particularly along the lines of 
sexuality, class, and race. They also deepen surveillance of influencer content by brand stakeholders, who are concerned 
that influencers will err and be “cancelled” (risking their investments in content). My critical framework synthesizes feminist 
critiques of ostensibly participatory influencer industries with close attention to critical algorithmic studies. This article 
provides an in-depth look at how brand risk and brand safety are predicted and measured using one tool, Peg. Through 
a “walk through” of this tool, underpinned by a wider industry ethnography, I demonstrate how value-laded algorithmic 
judgments map onto well-worn hierarchies of desirability and employability that originate from systemic bias along the lines 
of class, race, and gender.
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Influencer management tools use algorithms to categorize 
and process data, and predict outcomes—it is often implied 
that in doing so they position themselves as objective than 
humans. Yet, through their design and operation, influencer 
management tools present subjective calculations about the 
influencers who are most suitable for brand collaborations to 
marketing stakeholders through fuzzy inferences such as 
brand safety. So, as these inferences are used by brands, tools 
shape which influencers have access to these brand 
collaborations.
These decision-making processes and outcomes are 
urgently worth examining, as they scaffold employability in 
influencer ecologies. While an already fast-growing strain of 
creative work, influencers have been in particularly high 
commercial demand during COVID-19-induced social dis-
tancing, because of increases in social media consumption 
(most notably, Instagram and TikTok), and influencers’ abil-
ity to independently produce advertorial content from 
domestic spaces (Taylor, 2020). Influencer marketing was 
valued at US$8 billion in 2020 (Influencer Marketing Hub, 
2020). However, there are uneven relationships between 
brands and influencers, meaning this work is often highly 
laborious, under-compensated, and precarious (Caplan & 
Gillespie, 2020; Cotter, 2018; Duffy, 2017; Duffy & Hund, 
2015; O’Meara, 2019). Alongside accounts of inequalities, a 
growing body of work is examining the political economy of 
rapidly changing influencer industry in practice (Abidin, 
2017a; Abidin & Ots, 2016; Cunningham & Craig, 2018). 
Drawing from these bodies of work, I argue that it is thus 
worth probing how tools’ methodologies and operations 
work in context, as 40% of brands use third-party tools to 
support their digital marketing campaigns (Influencer 
Marketing Hub, 2020). Thus, their inferences, hierarchies, 
and presentations directly inform which individuals are 
financially legitimized within influencer ecologies, and 
therefore who produces the content we see online.
In this vein, influencer management tools are designed 
deepen surveillance of influencer content by brand stakehold-
ers who hope to monitor and hegemonize influencer behav-
ior: 84% of marketers surveyed in Influencer Marketing 
Hub’s 2020 report suggest that “brand safety” is a key con-
cern when running influencer marketing campaigns 
(Influencer Marketing Hub, 2020). This finding is supported 
by a high level of mistrust surrounding influencers, frequently 
articulated by industry leaders. For example, L’Oreal’s Chief 
Digital Officer, Cedric Dordain, told The Drum that “[L’Oreal] 
want more detail about the background of the influencers . . . 
From what they’ve posted in the past—not just on Instagram 
but on any social platform and any website or blog or forum” 
(Faull, 2018). In particular, L’Oreal is concerned about influ-
encer behavior—Dordian offers the example of “nude pic-
tures” as a key concern. A secondary concern is that of “fake 
followers”; Wired estimates that purchased followers or bots 
cost brands US$1.3 billion in 2019. Giving a keynote in 
Cannes in 2018, Unilever CMO Keith Weed called for 
increased transparency in influencer marketing, particularly 
citing concerns about “fakeness” and “dishonest practices” 
such as buying followers; he notes, “we need to take urgent 
action now to rebuild trust before it’s gone forever” (Unilever, 
2018). Influencer management tools are purchased by mar-
keting stakeholders as a layer of surveillance to increase trust 
in the industry, as meaningful solutions to bad behavior and 
fraud. They are designed to rationalize the so-called Wild 
West YouTube economy, at the same time, they make it more 
difficult for those producing content not defined as “brand 
safe” to sustain income and opportunities.
This article considers the role of one algorithmic influ-
encer management tool in shaping the influencer marketing 
ecology, and platformed creative economy. Through examin-
ing this tool, I seek to understand how value-laded algorith-
mic judgments can map onto well-worn hierarchies of 
desirability and employability, originating from systemic 
bias along the lines of race, sexuality, and gender. To do this, 
I draw from a 3-year ethnography of the “messy web,” mean-
ing the porous mix of offline and online spaces relevant to 
the influencer industry (Postill & Pink, 2012). I examined 
White Papers, About Us pages, terms and conditions, mar-
keting and press guidance, podcasts, trade press coverage, 
and conference presentations between 2017 and 2020. My 
ethnography is augmented by a focused walkthrough of a 
UK-based influencer marketing tool called Peg (2014). Peg 
uses historical data from influencer profiles and campaigns 
to generate scores representing influencer appeal, risk, and 
employability. I negotiated full access to this tool for 1 month, 
conducting my walkthrough in 2019.
This article opens by synthesizing feminist critiques of 
influencer industries with close attention to critical algorith-
mic studies. Then, I map the role of intermediaries in influ-
encer industries, outlining how a developing rotation of 
stakeholders shapes this growing strain of the creative econ-
omy. The context for commercial definitions of “brand 
safety” is then explored, leading to a sharper overview of 
how commercial strains of social injustice have been sus-
tained by algorithmic software across industries. Following 
this, I outline my methodological approach—a blend of digi-
tal ethnography of industry practices with a focused “walk-
through” of Peg. I introduce Peg’s vision and governance, 
positioning the tool within the wider milieu of influencer 
management software. Finally, I conduct a technical walk-
through of Peg. I provide an in-depth examination of Peg.
co’s “Statistics” tab, as it generates algorithmically predicted 
audience demographics data and the “Brand Safety” tab, 
which surveills influencers’ use of profanity, audience back-
lash, and their press coverage. Ultimately, I argue that by 
approximating analytics, and calculating subjective values 
such as “brand safety,” influencer management tools reify 
existing social inequalities in influencer industries, particu-
larly along the lines of sexuality, gender, and race. This is 
important as influencer industries have been heavily cri-
tiqued for their narrow representation of women and 
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under-compensation of LGBTQ+ creators and creators of 
color. As platforms become more saturated with content, it is 
essential to ask who precisely can afford to participate in pro-
duction, shaping information and culture that we can access 
to as audiences.
The Influencer Within Branded 
Cultures
Influencers blend everyday personal content with marketing 
communications producing “advertisements written in the 
form of an opinion editorial and deeply intertwined. . . with 
everyday lives as lived” (Abidin, 2016, p. 89). Originating 
from ostensibly do-it-yourself (DIY) media practices in the 
mid–late 2000s, influencer economies have gradually formal-
ized. Proto-influencer practices included mum bloggers 
founding advertising networks (Lopez, 2009), strategically 
using hyperlinks to build communities of cross-promotion and 
commercial engagement (Rocamora, 2012), and fashion blog-
gers attending runway shows to lend “hipster credibility” to 
high-fashion houses (Pham, 2011, p. 12),
Those previously identified as bloggers supplement or 
supplant blog content with Instagram, the channel for the 
commodified everyday in fashion and beauty verticals (Hund 
& McGuigan, 2019). The wider influencer ecology also 
includes beauty YouTubers, who integrate product place-
ment into cosmetic reviews (Hund, 2017; Jerslev, 2016) and 
now TikTokers, who are are the latest platform-dependent 
creators to ink deals with brands such as Proctor and Gamble 
Indeed (Stein, 2020). Influencers across social media plat-
forms comprise a significant link in beauty industries’ public 
relations strategies.
Influencers are “entrepeneural labourers,” who, like other 
creative workers experience the individualized pressures and 
risks of irregular and piecemeal (un)employment (Neff et al., 
2005). Precarity is heightened by double-layered surveillence or 
“visibility labour,” a mandate to attain fans and followers while 
curating commercial attention within a saturated attention econ-
omy (Abidin, 2016). Influencers must be agile, platform-ready, 
and contigent—or, ready and responsive to platform policies 
and algorithmic changes (Nieborg & Poell, 2018).
Many users are aware of the visibility platforms engender. 
They adapt their content or privacy settings to manage the 
“imagined surveillence” of their profiles (Duffy & Chan, 
2019); they develop strategies to negotiate platform func-
tions, for example, to facilitate newsfeed visibility (Bucher, 
2017). As professional platform users, influencers conduct 
research on industry trends and use their findings to piece 
together engaged approaches to gain and sustain visibility 
(Bishop, 2019). Keeping their industry embeddedness in 
mind, it is likely that many influencers are aware of influ-
encer management tools. Indeed, the legal template for a 
Social Media Influencer Letter Agreement (or contract) asks 
influencers to agree that “you understand that we will be 
monitoring your Posts” (Thomson Reuters, 2020b). Creators 
are thus likely aware of surviellence, yet, we will see that 
they have little recourse over the data it produces. The lop-
sided nature of these relationships will be explored in more 
detail later. For now, it is important to recognize that influ-
encers are dependant on platforms and other intermediaries 
within influencer marketing ecologies, rendering them alien-
ated from their production.
Influencer Intermediaries
Influencer economies are commerically viewed as a confusing, 
under-regulated, and messy Wild West. Thus, a growing num-
ber of intermediaries advertise their ability to streamline and 
professionalize the relationships between marketers and influ-
encers. Intermediaries include full-service “social talent” agen-
cies—which are functionally akin to traditional talent agencies, 
brokering deals for a proportional fee (Abidin, 2017b; Abidin 
& Ots, 2016; Hutchinson, 2017); loose “collectives” that 
matchmake influencers with brands, charging membership fees 
(Stoldt et al., 2019) and Multichannel Networks (MCNs), thus 
far the most researched influencer management models. MCNs 
aggregate channels, sell advertising, and cross-promote talent 
and content, particularly for YouTubers (Cunningham et al., 
2016). Each of these influencer management organizations fit 
Bourdieu’s definition of “cultural intermediaries,” in that they 
function to “divulge legitimate culture” in new cultural econo-
mies, in this case to reticent brands who should “have no need 
to be alarmed” as “they can recognize the ‘guarantees of qual-
ity’ offered by their moderately revolutionary tastemakers, who 
surround themselves with all the institutional signs of cultural 
authority” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 326). Those who develop algo-
rithmic influencer management tools sell expertise in influ-
encer industries to reassure brands who are nervous in working 
in these new and risky ecologies.
Although the remuneration structures and contractual 
obligations for each intermediary model diverge, most con-
nect influencers with commercial opportunities and offer a 
spectrum of support (e.g., with production and branding), in 
exchange for a percentage of influencer income. In turn, 
intermediary organizations promise brands increased control 
over content and messaging by disciplining and narrowing 
cultural production to limited commercially recognizable 
genres. Such commodifying practices have long histories 
across cultural production. Modeling agents identify talent 
based on commercial “types,” including light-skinned com-
mercial Black models who the “Midwest can relate to” 
(Wissinger, 2012, p. 134); record labels smooth and disci-
pline a plurality of “Latin music” into a commercially recog-
nizable genres like “salsa” (Negus, 1999). It is thus relevant 
that many intermediary models specialize in “popular chan-
nels that align with specific consumer ‘verticals’” (Lobato, 
2016, p. 357). Influencer management tools similarly claim 
to “surface hot talent in narrow verticals” (Forrester, 2020), 
which also map onto traditionally gendered genres, for 
example, sport, beauty, and fashion, or video gaming.
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It is relevant that the automation of intermediaries often 
functionally narrow assessments of commerciality. For 
example, the introduction of the automated sales-tracking 
tool “BookScan” in the early 2000s shaped literary editors’ 
purchasing decisions. As data became more comprehensive, 
poor sales records followed authors like “bad credit scores,” 
reducing their viability in the industry (Childress, 2012, p. 
613). Similarly, the arrival of “hard data” from music sales 
tracker Soundscan reshaped understandings of commercial 
music genres, and prompted significant investment in coun-
try music due to the growth of “suburban markets” (Negus, 
1999). Through search and monitoring functions, influencer 
management tools make and recommend influencers that 
align with popular, commercial themes and genres.
Influencers are commercially valuable for their authentic-
ity—in which their self-brands are hinged on consistent per-
formance of amateurism and relatability (Duffy, 2017). 
Authenticity is both desirable and risky; that influencers may 
be simply ordinary people stokes brands’ concerns about the 
unpredictability of their behavior. However, a particular per-
formance of authenticity has many crossovers with defini-
tions of brand safety; that is, it is consistent, virtuous, and 
glamarous, peppered with carefully managed “pourous” 
glimpses to acceptable mess of the everyday (Abidin, 2017a). 
Diagnoses of this style of authenticity dovetail with the inter-
sectional inequalities that suffuse growing creative online 
economies. Duffy (2016, 2017) convincingly demonstrates 
how perceptions of authenticity in influencer industries is 
distributed alongside privilege and nepotistic access to cre-
ative networks. The boundaries here are narrow; a mandate 
to visibility also directly harms women through gendered 
behavioral policing and harassment (Duffy & Hund, 2019). 
Oh and Oh (2017, p. 699) argue that “white perspectives and 
bodies” are “commercially favoured” on platforms like 
YouTube, for example, racist stereotypes are common in 
popular vlogs. Gaunt (2015, p. 247) demonstrates Black 
girls’ self presentations are “decontextualised” and ulti-
mately “stigmatized” on YouTube. Speaking within a broader 
context, Noble (2018) argues that “racism and sexism are 
part of the architecture and language of technology” (p. 9). 
These perspectives underpin my theoretical framework; 
influencer ecologies hinge on carefully performed identities 
that are not neutral. 
The following two sections underpin my critical analysis 
of influencer management tools. First, I examine the histori-
cal context of concerns about brand safety, and second, how 
bias informs algorithms and automated decision-making 
processes.
Brand Safety
Brands have historically funded media through paid adver-
tising. In so doing they desire to influence content and reward 
production that is “noncontroversial, light and non-political” 
as this sustains a ‘“buying mood’” (Bagdikian, 1997, p. 113). 
Sustaining brand safety is thus a priority for content produc-
ers desiring to attract advertising dollars. Practically, brand 
safety is a positive reproduction of a brand’s ideals, an avoid-
ance of controversy, and a circumvention of sex, violence, 
and profanity (Fahey, 1991). As the same advertisers who 
have a long history of funding network media fund the influ-
encer ecology, an avoidance of the aforementioned “big 
three” animates the search for influencers to sponsor. 
Particularly in marketing industries, diagnosis of brand 
safety has particularly haunted celebrities hired to represent 
brands (Pringle, 2004). They subject representatives to a dis-
ciplining “corporate gaze,” mandating that they channel and 
convey brand values (Wissinger, 2012, p. 131). The follow-
ing section outlines several contextualizing examples of how 
such assessment sits alongside marginalization; of women, 
people of color, and LGBTQ+ people.
First, the surveillance of sexuality has been particularly 
salient for women within promotional cultures. A cultural 
fixation with girls as being at risk dovetailed with young 
women being established as a consumer group. Since this 
moment in the early 1990s, girls’ potential became socially 
positioned as something to be closely watched and managed, 
particularly, alongside moral concerns about “juvenile delin-
quency, nihilism, and antisocial attitudes” (Harris, 2004, p. 
24). A much-studied example of this cultural preoccupation 
with girls at risk, is Miley Cyrus, whose wholesome Disney 
Channel tween brand shifted to a twerking, nude-posting, 
sexualized adult in the late 2000s.
The media attention (or obsession) surrounding this 
moment linked Cyrus’ sexualized turn with risk, positing that 
girls would emulate her behaviors in ways that would cause 
them psychological or reputational damage (Vares & 
Jackson, 2015). Importantly, Cyrus then became a brand risk. 
She was described being dropped from a Walmart deal and 
the animated film Hotel Transylvania during this time. 
Female influencers are similarly dogged by questions about 
their suitability as role models; assessments are located in 
good/bad binaries. Beauty influencer Zoella is a regular tar-
get of such coverage; her ability to be a role model is fre-
quently raked over by press. She was determined as “racy” 
by the Daily Mail for posting a Snapchat story featuring a 
hint of underwear (Kelly, 2016), “greedy” by the Mirror for 
her merchandise pricing (Mulroy, 2017), and the launch of 
her ghost-written book was charged with causing “declining 
literacy rates” among children in The Guardian (Williams, 
2017). This representation of Zoella is symptomatic of a 
media framework that exclusively frames young women as 
good or bad role models.
Such coverage is apparently concerned that young female 
celebrities may poorly influence their young audiences—
placing them in opposition to morality, chaste sexuality, con-
servative dress, healthful consumption behaviors (McRobbie, 
2009). Industry texts call on brands to monitor influencers to 
“protect their reputations” (Callahan, 2017). The legal firm 
Thompson Reuters advises brands to add a “Morals Clause” 
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to their contracts “to give the advertiser the right to terminate 
the agreement for acts by the talent that might reflect nega-
tively on the advertiser.” The behaviors that may violate such 
a clause are vague and unclear; they are listed as “moral tur-
pitude” or “to offend public morals” (Thomson Reuters, 
2020a). The application of this may be broad—recall that 
L’Oreal’s influencer background checks involve vetting for 
“nude pictures” (Faull, 2018).
Brand safety is raced. Blackness specifically has been 
bound up with risk in cultural industries (H. Gray, 2004; 
Saha, 2018). Within music industries, record labels distance 
themselves from rap as a genre due to associations with “pro-
fanity, violence, and misogyny” (Negus, 1999, p. 94). The 
marketization of rap is suffused with racist anxieties about its 
potential to travel to different markets and endure through 
time; thus, rap and other “raced” music genres receive mini-
mal investment from mainstream record labels (Negus, 
1999). Generically, diverse Black musical acts are often ste-
reotyped and marketed as “Urban” (Balaji, 2009). On televi-
sion, broadcasters have historically avoided shows that were 
“perceived to appeal only to black people”; a small number 
of Black-cast shows were considered to have “crossover 
appeal” if they were “safe for white consumption” (Fuller, 
2010, p. 290). Advertisers’ comfort levels have been a key 
factor in political economic decision-making; cable channels 
partially or fully funded by subscription models could take 
risks by purchasing Black content. These brief examples 
demonstrate an important precedent for advertisers’ racist 
perception of risk and safety, which have contributed to lim-
ited representations and distribution of Black content on 
social media platforms.
As the “mainstream,” White audiences are “the ideal sub-
jects of consumerism and representation” (H. Gray, 2005, p. 
95). In each of the examples cited here Black audiences 
remain a commercial market, but one that is economically 
and culturally valued as niche. Similar practices of narrow-
casting play out in influencer economies as Black influenc-
ers are hired for fewer commercial campaigns, or function as 
“tokens” to signal diversity (Dodgson, 2020). Black influ-
encers are paid drastically less than their White colleagues, 
and are more likely to be approached and hired by smaller 
brands addressing Black audiences, for example, natural 
haircare (Carman, 2020). These factors contribute to real vis-
ibility and pay inequality, which is augmented by platforms’ 
racialized practices such as YouTube’s “Supporting Black 
Creators” initiatives. These functionally raise visibility in 
certain contexts, but have arguably done little to improve 
Black creators’ economic positioning on the platform, as 
Black creators are still avoided by advertisers.
Finally, until the mid-1990s advertisers avoided associa-
tion with homosexuality; Fahey (1991) demonstrates how 
advertisers routinely withdrew from media depicting homo-
sexual themes, and brands rarely hired LGBTQ+ spokespeo-
ple (Ragusa, 2005). Although LGBTQ+ consumers have 
been identified as a lucrative niche market, this market is 
constructed as “white, male, professional, urban with an 
abundance of good taste and discrectionary income” (Sender, 
2004, p. 8). Sender argues that this conservative picture of 
gay consumers does not accurately reflect the diversity of 
LGBTQ+ people in addition to eradicating any relationship 
with overt sexuality. Brand safety involves navigating 
between “business interests and political risk” (Sender, 2004, 
p. 98) transmorphing identity into what is contained, sexless, 
and sanitized. More recently, YouTube has been criticized for 
designating everyday LGBTQ+ YouTubers’ content as non-
brand safe, reducing commercial opportunities and income 
(Alexander, 2019). In 2019, some of those affected brought 
legal action against the platform, claiming both automated 
systems and human reviewers tagged videos using terms 
such as “gay,” ‘bisexual’ or “trans” as unsuitable for adver-
tisers. Herein, brand safety skews toward discrimination of 
marginalized peoples. The following section demonstrates 
how this trend is often extended by algorithmic tools used for 
influencer hiring decisions.
Algorithmic Management
Algorithms are fetishised for their “objectivity” in this case, 
are “formulaic with an identified function or role that deter-
mines the steps and the processes that are employed” 
(Willson, 2017, p. 5). Algorithmic software is increasingly 
introduced to manage datasets (often groups of people) who 
are viewed as unruly, messy, or risky. By using algorithmic 
influencer management tools, brands hope to make the glut 
of user-generated content produced by influencers managa-
ble and monetizable. In so doing, however, they reify exist-
ing social inequalities. This is because algorithms are 
“embedded in old systems of power and privilege” (Eubanks, 
2018, p. 178). They classify individuals while giving little 
insight into their processes, or how to address instances of 
misclassification. Indeed, it is no coincidence that influencer 
management tools draw from colonial discourse in framing 
influencer ecologies as a “Wild West” to be stabilized and 
managed. As Benjamin (2019, p. 8) points out, such techno-
logical solutions often “hide, speed up or even deepen dis-
crimination.” Long social histories of discriminatory 
decision-making are baked into engineering practices, train-
ing datasets, and underscore patterns in predictive algorith-
mic modeling.
Algorithms “judge similarity and probablity” and use 
“categories to discipline action” (Ananny, 2016, pp. 102–
103). They predict outcomes without understanding inten-
tion and context. Indeed, algorithms act on “measurable 
types,” assigning users identities and categories “directed 
towards operability and efficiency, not representative enact-
ness” (Cheney-Lippold, 2017, p. 50). As this article’s analy-
sis sets out, measurable types such as brand safety can only 
be an approximation, relying on coded definitions of safety 
and risk, which run alongside intersections of discriminatory 
decisions and oversights.
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Algorithms are often advertised with small margins for 
error, yet, even small errors can have significant implica-
tions. Gillespie (2018) provocatively queries what is an 
acceptable rate of “false positive” in categorization and pre-
diction; “when it comes to culture and expression, even a few 
false positives can be a real concern, depending on whether 
these errors are idoscyncractic or systemic” (p. 104). As this 
article demonstrates, so-called errors particularly harm Black 
users, in addition to those along intersections of marginal-
ized identity. Critical scholars argue that these “errors” are 
often designed for; that raced inequality is “fundamental to 
the operating system of the web” (Noble, 2018, p. 10). And 
indeed, we know that it is those who are intersectionally mar-
ginalized in society that are, systemically, targeted and 
affected by algorithmic discrimination. There are multiple 
examples from 2020 alone; Twitter systematically cropped 
out Black faces in image preview, TikTok looped White cre-
ators (and excluded those of color) through its content-filter-
ing algorithm. Epps-Darling (2020) defines the frequency of 
moments of algorithmic prejudice as “technological micro-
agressions,” demonstrating how Black users’ experiences of 
technology are consistently animated by systematic discrimi-
nation. In the limited scope of this article, I deepen insight 
into how this exclusion happens, specifically in influencer 
economies by examining how influencer management tools 
extend the exclusion of “Black digital practioners” from the 
“capitalist economies of social media” (Brock, 2019, p. 215).
Method
Industry and scholars position algorithms as black boxes, 
where the inner workings of algorithmic systems are deliber-
ately or pragmatically obscured (Pasquale, 2015). Often the 
fetishization of the complexity of algorithms is a “red herring, 
a piece of information that distracts from the other” (ref). 
There are no guarantees that cracking open the black box will 
reveal secrets or make the roots of bias or discrimination visi-
ble in algorithmic systems (Ananny & Crawford, 2018). Even 
scrutinizing code often cannot reveal how algorithms are 
always constructed by, and in tandem with, humans. Rather, 
for Bucher there is a methodological opportunity in studying 
the ancillary content that surrounds algorithms and their for-
mations. This includes “press releases, conference papers on 
machine learning techniques . . . media reports, blog posts” in 
addition to other available texts and resources (Bucher, 2018, 
p. 61). A dataset is generated that can be analyzed (“taken 
apart”) and “interpreted and shaped” according to the research-
er’s own frameworks (A. Gray, 2003).
Informed by this approach, my methodology involves gath-
ering background information about influencer management 
tools, including White Papers, About Us pages, marketing and 
press guidance, podcasts, trade press coverage and conference 
presentations between 2017 and 2019. This process was 
guided by a broader ethnography of the UK influencer market-
ing industry. Second, I negotiated full access to Peg for 
1 month, and used the “walkthrough method,” combining 
Science and Technology Studies and Cultural Studies 
approaches to systematically analyze Peg’s “technological 
mechanisms and embedded cultural references” (Light et al., 
2018). I walked through the Peg platform as a brand, interro-
gating its features, options and guidelines. The walkthrough 
method offered a guiding approach to support thickly describ-
ing and analyzing Peg’s interfaces, scenarios of use, political 
economic factors and governance, technical features, tone, 
symbolic representation, and interface.
Despite the clear limitations of being unable to reveal how 
influencer management tools work, the multisited approach 
employed in this article can demonstrate how they are con-
ceived, sold, and embedded within marketing industries. I offer 
valuable insight into how data intermediaries are being wielded 
to make decisions in growing datafied marketing industries. 
My method focuses on how influencer management tools can 
integrate bias, and amplify and sustain discrimination for work-
ers within influencer industries. As a start, I briefly overview 
Peg’s vision, operating model, and governance.
Peg
Peg was founded in 2014 and is run by a small team in 
London, UK. The tool is marketed and sold directly via their 
website, which prominently displays the logos of recogniz-
able companies who have employed the software, such as 
L’Oreal, Google, and Lego. These logos appear next to testi-
monials from public relations (PR) agencies and a positive 
review (dotted with stars) from industry watchdog “Influencer 
Marketing Hub.” The site’s clean, polished aesthetics, and 
testimonials are comparable with the homepages of many 
B2B promotional services. However, Pegs strives toward 
legitimization by association with prominent brands is worth 
noting when considering their positioning in influencer mar-
keting industries. Although creator economies are often cat-
egorized as disruptive or divergent from “mainstream” media 
and advertising spaces, in practice, influencer marketing is 
often shaped by association with the very same actors who 
are long-time funders of these industries. Through their web-
site, Peg underscores this point through their emphasis on 
their alliance with mainstream promotional cultures.
There is no price point publicly available for Peg. Rather, 
users can request a product demonstration by submitting their 
name, job title, company name, and phone number. Submitting 
a Gmail address returns an error code, prodding users to 
instead submit a work email. This implies “serious enquiries 
only.” On completion of this form, a message informs the user 
that “we will be in touch shortly”—in other words “don’t call 
us, we’ll call you.” For this project, I negotiated access to Peg 
through my networks, but at different times attempted to sign 
up for free trials for other influencer marketing software. In 
each instance, I inputted my job title (Lecturer) and my 
employer (King’s College) to forms on their websites. My 
requests to CreatorIQ and Traackr went unanswered, while 
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Mavrck and Upfluence invited me to book a request to have a 
demo call. Influencer marketing software is tightly gatekept—
you are not guaranteed the advertised free trial, rather, you are 
vetted via Zoom call. Imagined users are legitimate stakehold-
ers within closed PR industries. Influencers, then, cannot view 
how they are presented to brands, or correct inaccuracies, 
often as they simply cannot enter the software. This ultimately 
alienates further from their own representation and data, par-
ticularly in relation to weighty algorithmic judgments made 
about them.
Influencers do have the option to partner with Peg to pro-
vide the software with accurate data. If they do not sign up to 
the Peg partnership, they will be automatically listed on the 
software, but with Peg’s algorithmically approximated met-
rics. Further research is required into influencers’ awareness 
of management tools. However, reflecting on the sheer vol-
ume of software entering the market, it is clear that even if 
they are very aware, verification with each one would be 
time-consuming. There are, however, shortcuts available for 
some. Talent agents often forge partnerships with influencer 
software providers—for example, Peg has partnered with 
elite UK digital talent manager GleamFutures to batch 
approve their clients’ data. These deals give the upper hand 
to influencers with talent managers, ultimately calcifying 
inequalities as those with representation are often White, 
middle-class, and commercially attractive (Bishop, 2018).
Any influencer who verifies with Peg grants the software 
access to all of their personal data available through the API, 
“including but not limited to measurements of user activity, 
geographics and demographics, video view counts and rat-
ings, traffic sources and user device type and operating sys-
tems” (Peg.co, 2019a). What is perhaps more important is 
that they also grant Peg
creation and unlimited use and disclosure of data which 
combines or aggregates
(wholly or in part) the Creator Data with other data or 
information, or otherwise
adapts the Creator Data, to such a degree that it cannot be 
identified as originating
or deriving directly from the Creator Data, cannot be reverse-
engineered such that it can so be identified, and is not capable of 
use substantially as a substitute for the Creator Data. (Peg.co, 
2019a)
Even providing Peg with access to your YouTube account, 
and thereby giving them the opportunity to verify data, the 
software will continue to make algorithmic calculations that 
cannot be “reverse engineered.” These subjective calcula-
tions (which are explored in the discussion to follow) are 
calculated in obscure ways—intermeshing YouTube with 
many other data points that can be gathered without creator 
authorization or consent.
The cat’s cradle of data points used here has particular 
implications when Peg also takes pains to abscond their 
responsibility as an intermediary, stating plainly in their 
Terms and Conditions that “we are not your agent, advisor or 
consultant.” This smoothes over Peg’s link in the influencer 
marketing chain—although they have automated some of the 
key activities of a talent agent (such as advertising and vet-
ting clients for jobs and opportunities), they maintain that 
they are simply a platform—a neutral term that glosses over 
their role in decision-making and advisory work (Gillespie, 
2010). Indeed, Peg’s presentation is heavily invested in neu-
trality, particularly through their investment in data—which 
Nic Yeeles has called “99% accurate” (Ghosh, 2016). Many 
questions spring from this statement—how can a subjective 
quality like brand safety be predicted accurately? Who does 
this accuracy serve? The following section will examine two 
key features of Peg—the “Statistics” tab, as it generates 
algorithmically predicted audience demographics data and 
the “Brand Safety” tab, which surveills influencers’ use of 
profanity, audience backlash, and their press coverage. I 
explore how each section functions, and how each section 
may contribute to inequalities within influencer industries.
The Statistics Tab
The statistics presents a consolidation of metrics for any 
influencer. Through colorful graphs, it presents an account of 
influencers’ YouTube subscribers, Instagram followers, and 
a calculated average of their views and likes. Under this tab, 
Peg also presents influencers’ audience information includ-
ing demographics: audience gender, age, and location. This 
provision is remarkable as the data are ostensibly accessible 
through private platform provided analytics, only available 
to content owners. Peg automatically generates demograph-
ics data for any and all content creators, approximated based 
on Peg’s “own algorithms” (Ghosh, 2016). If influencers 
verify with Peg, these data will be matched with YouTube 
data. However, as we saw earlier, these data are meshed with 
a mix of other data points. Although this hard numeric data is 
fetishized as objective and by the tool it is pulled from a 
number of obfuscated sources, stretched, and molded accord-
ing to Peg’s designs, without the understanding or interven-
tion of those who it is supposed to represent.
Predicted demographics data serves two functions. First, 
brand representatives can easily search a wide range of influ-
encers based on their desired audience demographics. This 
feature emphasizes that media continues to be funded based 
on its ability to capture and package desirable audiences 
(Ang, 1991). Second, demographics information as pre-
sented by Peg can be part of a secondary process of verifica-
tion. Industry standards dictate that demographics data are 
currently provided to brands by influencers themselves, 
accessible through platform analytics for content owners. 
Due to reliance on the self-presentation of analytics, fraud in 
this space is a key concern among marketing stakeholders; 
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Unilever CMO Keith Weed stated the importance of 
“increase[ing] transparency in the influencer space” (Stewart, 
2018). Peg mirrors this language, stating that their tool is 
driven “by real results not vanity metrics” (Peg.co, 2019b). 
The value of verification data is consistent with research that 
demonstrates the importance of demographics data to adver-
tisers (Bivens & Haimson, 2016; Turow, 2011).
To take one example within the statistics tap, Peg clearly 
provides an “Audience Gender” breakdown; a stable, binary 
percentage of “men” and “women” are communicated 
through a pink and blue pie chart. There is no information 
about how these gendered audiences are calculated; whether 
they are pulled from YouTube (whose own accuracy has 
been questioned) or augmented using other data sources. 
Research has shown that algorithmically approximated 
demographics categories such as “gender” are dynamically 
created, and continuously and automatically categorized 
online. We can and should question their veracity; Cheney-
Lippold (2017) notes, “it’s ‘measurable types’ universality of 
allowable wrongness that shape our experiences online, con-
tributing metrics presented as measured ‘truths’” (p. 65). To 
refer to Cheney-Lippold’s example, Google’s search behav-
ior data are inferred by how they behave—meaning they are 
categorized by stereotypes that configure online experience. 
Similarly, Bivens (2017) demonstrates that (despite offering 
over 57 custom gender options) binary demographics data 
are so crucial to advertisers on Facebook, that the platform 
“computational re-[classifies] custom gender selection on 
the user interface back into what amounts to a binary” 
(Bivens, 2017, p. 893). Again, this example shows that nor-
mative assessments of online behavior supersede the gender 
identities that individuals claim for themselves. These works 
demonstrate the value of automatically generated binary data 
for marketers. Peg.co’s provision of verifiable statistics is 
designed to fact-check influencers’ and platform-provided 
analytics. There is no evidence that they successfully mea-
sure material identity. Rather, the availability of data super-
sedes accuracy, as it is demanded by marketers.
Peg: Brand Safety Tab
Peg uses machine learning algorithms to approximate a 
Safety Score out of 100, made up of three other scores: a 
Family Friendly rating measuring “bad language and profan-
ity,” an Audience Consistency score representing influencers 
“consistent reception from their audience,” and a Controversy 
Free score measuring whether influencers are “covered neg-
atively in the press or associated with controversial topics” 
(Peg.co, 2019a). The following section will analyze the pre-
sentation of these micro-scores, and how discrimination 
across intersections of marginalized communities can 
become baked into the macro Safety Score in Peg.
Family Friendly measures instances of profanity (termed 
“Naughty Words”) in an influencers’ video metadata (titles 
and tags) and spoken words using language processing. The 
Peg dashboard presents a color-coded breakdown of all his-
toric Naughty Words uttered by an influencer in any pub-
lished video. Instances are totaled over a YouTube lifetime; 
gaming vlogger Pewdiepie has used Naughty Words in 108 
videos, beauty vlogger Zoella has used them in 17. The 
severity of the language is categorized using a traffic light 
system; “Piss,” “crap,” and “damn” are coded green. Orange 
words include “arse,” “dick,” and “vagina.” Words coded in 
red include severe profanity such as “fuck” and “shit,” but 
also racist slurs. The implied parity here is jarring from a 
functional perspective, even without ethical issues; brand 
backlash from an influencer exclaiming “fuck” is unlikely to 
equal that of the use of a (directed or undirected) racist slur. 
A guide to the values informing confusing judgments is 
missing: what makes “tit” orange and “boob” green? What 
contributes to the medically correct term “vagina” being 
coded orange, the same categorization as “whore” and “ass”? 
Naughty Word categorizations matter because stakeholders 
do not have access to information on how words are catego-
rized and why. Hundreds of influencers’ spoken words are 
categorized are then streamlined into the Family Friendly 
score, which then have a significant impact in overall Safety 
Score. These categorizations are used to select influencers 
and distribute income and opportunities.
Algorithms cannot measure context, and cannot attend to 
experiences sustained intricate intersections of race and gen-
der identity within social and cultural life. Writing on content 
moderation has highlighted contextual challenges for com-
mercial platforms, for example, Facebook notably flagged 
1972 Pulitzer Prize winning photograph Napalm Girl for 
child nudity (Gillespie, 2018). The following section outlines 
two comparable examples of complexity which shape the 
classification of safety on Peg. The decontextualized analysis 
of language to measure for brand safety works against minor-
ity communities because tools are designed to read decontex-
tualized language through a heteronormative and White lens.
First, the word “queer” is coded as a green Naughty Word. 
While queer does have roots as a homophobic slur, it is a 
term used widely in activism and LGBTQ+ communities, in 
addition to within deconstructivist theory to recognize that 
sexualities are “unstable, fluid and constructed” (Gamson, 
1995, p. 392). So, one may identify as queer, partake in queer 
activism, or discuss queer theory. In many of these contexts, 
queer can be an everyday or academic identifier, and is used 
by YouTubers to align content with LGBTQ+ communities 
and audience.
My walkthrough revealed that several high-profile 
LGBTQ+ influencers have been identified by Peg for their 
use of “queer” as a Naughty Word, including A List YouTubers 
Ingrid Nilsen and Tyler Oakley—decreasing their Family 
Friendly scores. Tyler Oakley’s YouTube series “Stories of 
Queer Resilience” is flagged by Peg for the use of the word 
“queer” as brand unsafe. This series, however, features celeb-
rities that have long attracted advertising partnerships such as 
Olympic Skier Gus Kenworthy, the face of hair care Head and 
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Shoulders. The classification of words such as “queer” as 
brand unsafe punishes creators who use it by lowering their 
safety score, reducing their visibility in tools’ search func-
tions, and making them less likely to be complements of the 
ongoing YouTube demonetization of LGBTQ+ content out-
lined in the literature review. However, while YouTube’s pro-
prietary algorithms are black-boxed, Peg’s dashboard makes 
the commercial punishment associated with use of LGBTQ+ 
terminology explicit. This adds a layer of confirmation that 
can be useful to research and activists uncovering the 
LGBTQ+ bias.
The second example of contextual complexity involves 
“ni**er,” a term coded red. Peg identifies that KSI, a Black 
British vlogger, has used “n**ger” three times in one video, 
contributing to his low Family Friendly score of three. The 
video is a parodic music video featuring KSI’s family humor-
ously rapping about KSI’s recent successes. A line rapped by 
KSI’s mum includes the word “n**ger” in the style of many 
popular rap artists; the shock of a middle-aged woman per-
forming typical street lyrics adds to the gag. It is clear that 
“n**ger” is a word with hugely complex etymology. For 
many, but not all, it “takes on a completely different complex-
ion when uttered by someone who is Black in contrast to 
someone who is white” but the word is ultimately “contingent, 
changeable and context-specific” (Kennedy, 1999, pp. 91–94). 
Indeed, context is central, but is not represented through the 
Peg scores. For comparison, Pewdiepie is a White gaming 
vlogger who has featured “c**n” six times and “n**ger” 
twice, in one case during a parodic “hip hop” dance. Like KSI, 
Pewdiepie also has a “family-friendly” score of 3. In both 
cases outlined, it is individuals in minority groups who are 
penalized for reclaiming words that have historically been 
used against them. In a saturated influencer marketplace, small 
differences in Safety Scores may have significant impact on 
income. It is important, therefore, to understand how judg-
ments ignore the contradictory nature of culture, in a way that 
may impact and harm historically marginalized groups.
Audience Consistency: This score measures whether 
influencers are “receiving a consistently good reception from 
their audience,” by measuring like to dislike ratios on 
YouTube videos (Peg.co, 2019a). This ratio is visualized in a 
graph, dipping into an angry red Backlash Zone if a video 
receives more “dislike” votes than “like” votes for the 
YouTube channel’s average. The area is illustrated with a red 
exclamation point, signaling a hazard.
Although the like/dislike ratio is designed to approximate 
creator scandals, it actually measures an audience’s tolerance 
for creator behaviors. For example, gaming vlogger 
Pewdiepie’s use of anti-Semitic language has been widely 
profiled, yet he has high audience consistency score of 9/10. 
He only dips into the Backlash Zone on a video entitled 
“WHY I DON’T LIKE MARVEL MOVIES.” Similarly, 
Impaulsive, the podcast hosted by controversial vlogger 
Logan Paul, has an audience consistency score of 8/10, never 
dipping into the Backlash Zone, despite Paul hosting far 
right commentator Alex Jones on the podcast in April 2019. 
During the podcast Jones (who was banned from YouTube in 
2018) discussed conspiracy theories and called Megyn Kelly 
a “goddam lying whore” (Impaulsive, 2019). According to 
Peg.co, this video is brand safe.
Indeed, influencers whose brands are built on being con-
troversial tend to have very consistent like/dislike ratios, a 
positive metric for Audience Consistency and their overall 
Safety Score. In many mainstream online spaces hate speech, 
misogyny and racism are not only present but performed as 
pleasurable. Phillips (2015) points out that trolls who regu-
larly visit 4chan, an androcentric platform sharing 
Pewdiepie’s audience, “enjoy racist expression” (p. 96). 
There is evidence of a wider normalized “networked 
racialised hostility” within YouTube comments (Murthy & 
Sharma, 2019, p. 209). There is institutionalized racism in 
social life, and within social media platforms, as spaces 
where social life is lived and produced. The above discussion 
demonstrates how discrimination and bias leak into influ-
encer management tools, and what they can tell us about the 
political economy of influencer industries. An unsurprising 
finding, perhaps, is that the Backlash Zone would suggest 
that brands are concerned with how audiences may react to 
videos, rather than the pursuit of social justice.
Measuring audience consistency as a factor in brand safety 
also has implications for victims of racist, sexist, sustained 
online attacks. These campaigns are part of “toxic technocul-
tures,” which exploit social media platforms as a “channel of 
coordination and harassment” (Massanari, 2017, p. 333). In 
this vein, marginalized users suffer the “risk of visibility,” as 
their online presence is weaponized, mocked, and harassed in 
an attempt to silence them (Massanari, 2018, p. 1).
Beauty influencer Scarlett London felt the consequences 
of this risk, when an Instagram advertorial for mouthwash 
became the center of trolling swarm in late 2018. In the 
advert, London lies on a blanket decorated with her own 
image, surrounded by 20 heart-shaped balloons and straw-
berry pancakes (that on closer inspection suspiciously appear 
to be folded corn tortillas). While excessive, the image uti-
lizes standard tropes of Instagram glamor. However, it was 
screenshotted and Tweeted with the caption “fuck off this is 
anyone’s normal morning” (Nathan, 2018), retweeted 20,000 
times and picked up by the Daily Mail, amplifying the swarm 
and causing further backlash. The public critique of London’s 
image was couched in concerns about social media’s influ-
ence on self-esteem and mental health. However, this dis-
course drew on sustained critiques against highly visible 
young women—that London was vain, opportunistic, and 
fake. Crucially, Peg identifies that Scarlett London dips well 
into the Backlash Zone for this period, reducing her Safety 
Score and likely affecting income and opportunities for 
brands using Peg. Backlash is uneven: women and people of 
color are more vulnerable attacks that diminish an Audience 
Consistency score and overall Safety Score, both used by 
brands make recruitment decisions.
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Controversy Free: This score measures whether influenc-
ers are “covered negatively in the press or associated with 
controversial topics” (Peg.co, 2019a). A scrollbar displays 
thumbnails of all press coverage of a given influencer. 
Coverage is categorized by “positive,” ‘negative, or “very 
negative.” Peg allows users to view media coverage by 
recent or by “top outlets,” which include (UK publications) 
The Sun, the Daily Mail, The Telegraph, and the Independent. 
Although top outlets imply some editorial distinction, these 
outlets frequently engage in misogynistic reporting, particu-
larly taking aim at young and visible women to benefit from 
their highly visibility and large fanbases (Gies, 2011; Vares 
& Jackson, 2015).
The uneven attention toward the actions of young women 
is normalized within press and society more broadly; it 
means that female influencers will always be at increased 
risk of “negative” or “very negative” press attention, feeding 
into (decreasing) their overall Peg Safety Score. On the con-
trary, controversial vlogger’s PewDiePie’s press coverage 
was categorized as near-exclusively positive in Peg. Although 
articles similarly focused on how much PewDiePie earned 
(e.g., “meet the man making $4 million a YEAR from his 
bedroom”), such affirmation was uncoupled with the critique 
of PewDiePie’s exploitation or vanity levied at feminized 
vloggers such as Zoella.
Conclusion
In many cultural contexts, but particularly in the United 
Kingdom, creative work has been enthusiastically heralded 
as a pathway for entrepreneurship and social mobility. It is 
those at intersections of social inequalities that are most 
harmed by these trends. The valorization of creative work 
normalizes forms of precarious, individualized employment 
alongside a reduction in workers’ rights and social protec-
tions. The hyper-individualized nature of online content cre-
ation complements the UK government’s decimation of 
creative industries funding during ongoing austerity. 
Promises of creative success are now channeled toward 
social media platforms, who exacerbate mythologies of the 
lucrative and participatory nature of contingent production. 
For example, the UK Media Trust now offers “vlog training” 
for young people, post-16 Colleges advertise courses in 
vlogging and content creation and Ronan Harris, VP of 
Google UK, sits on the UK Government’s Creative Industries 
Council—which is responsible for identifying skills short-
ages and distributing funding. In critical media industry stud-
ies, it is important to attend to the specific ways that the 
mythological power of creative work translates to the uneven 
distribution of employment opportunities.
Influencer management tools make up one part of the 
ecology of intermediaries that work to forge inequalities in 
influencer economies, by selling diagnoses of brand safety 
which further entrenches longstanding hierarchies in influ-
encer industries. Through their marketing as objective 
software, influencer management tools are used to shore up 
decisions made by intermediaries, such as talent agents and 
brand liaisons. They justify selection processes that exclude 
marginalized influencers, harming them economically, as 
those with lower scores are less likely to be hired by brand. 
Brands using Peg include Lego, L’Oreal, and EA Games; 
40% of all brands use similar software. Thus, scores likely 
impact the financial sustainability of the YouTube channels 
run by marginalized creators, which thereby shapes the gen-
dered and raced representation on YouTube. In so doing, 
influencer management tools make a profit—the types of 
exploitation here are multifaceted.
Peg, alongside other influencer management software, is 
very invested in promoting their complex data science, which 
sustains their legitimacy as experts and intermediaries. Such 
promotion fits with big data’s “mythology” of “truth, objectiv-
ity and accuracy” (Boyd & Crawford, 2012, p. 663). Peg define 
their algorithmic processes in opaque and humerous copy, for 
example, “sponsored content [is] directed using clever sciency 
stuff,” boasting their tool is “jam-packed with advanced fea-
tures, AI algorithms and machine learning models” (Peg.co, 
2019a). They harden fuzzy and subjective concepts such as 
brand safety, but in so doing encode decontextualized lan-
guage through a heteronormative and White lens. Influencer 
markets are intensely saturated; estimates put the number of 
YouTube channels at 37 million, approximately 2,200 chan-
nels have 1 million subscribers. Decisions about who to hire 
are bound up with risk. Like Bookscan and Soundscan in pub-
lishing and music industries, intermediaries such as brand rep-
resentatives and talent managers use automated tools to 
sharpen and justify decisions, which in practice are based on a 
number of subjective feelings and 
These uses of AI could be intentionally or accidentally 
weaponized, particularly as the science behind them is 
knotty with high proportions of false positives, and imper-
fect training data. Claims to expertise legitimize the endorse-
ments made by influencer management tools; we should 
attend to which influencers they validate and promote, 
seemingly supported by metrics and data. Moreover, it is 
important that there is a historical precedent for sociocul-
tural discrimination against women, people of color and 
LGBTQ+ people in promotional ecologies. Understanding 
this context should give us pause before diagnosing issues 
as simply algorithmic errors.
Although influencer management tools rapidly enter the 
market, they can exit just as fast. For example, they alter 
their algorithmic processes, are shut down or purchased—
thus how they work is broadly inaccessible to researchers. 
My multisited approach to researching these tools presents a 
start, to show how software is being used to distribute 
employment opportunities within influencer economies. 
More research is needed into how algorithmically enlivened 
software works, how they are involved in the distribution of 
work, and how they are imagined and used within marketing 
industries.
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